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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROY ERWIN PRICE,

Plaintiff-Appell,ant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

12882

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Roy Erwin Price, appeals from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Roy Erwin Price filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah State
Prison was invalid. The matter was heard on March 28,
1972, before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, who denied the
writ on March 29, 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the denial of the
writ made by Judge Jeppson.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter stated:
The transcript of arraignment (Exhibit 2) indicates
that petitioner had discussed his arraignment with his
attorney, and knew what an arraignment was (Exhibit
2, P. 2).
The transcript of the entry of the plea (Exhibit 1)
shows that the district attorney, Richard L. Maxfield,
informed the court that Mr. Price had served time before,
and understood the results of the offense (Exhibit 1, P.
3). The court then asked defendant if he had served time
in the penitentiary before, to which Mr. Price replied that
he had (Exhibit 1, P. 3). The court finally asked if Mr.
Price wanted to be heard, and defendant's counsel replied
that he had nothing to say (Exhibit 1, P. 3).
At the habeas corpus proceeding, appellant testified
that he discussed his guilty plea with his counsel, and
decided to plead guilty to avoid an habitual criminal
charge (R. 45, 46). Mr. Price also admitted that he looked
up certain aspects of the law (R. 53), and was familiar
with the legal system (R. 51), due process (R. 54), and
the judicial process of trying, convicting and sentencing
criminals (R. 51).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS
THAT APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED HIS GU I LT Y
PLEA.
The petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding has the
burden of proving the grounds upon which he relies for
his release by providing evidence that is clear and convincing. McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Ut.ah 2d 354, 358, 423
P. 2d 166, 169 ( 1967). In the present case, petitioner's
only ground for habeas corpus relief is that his guilty plea
was invalid because the record shows no intelligent and
knowing waiver of his rights, or that he was adequately
informed of such rights. The voluntariness of appellant's
guilty plea is not disputed.
In Utah, there is a presumption that a plea of guilty
is knowingly and intelligently made, and a defendant who

attacks this presumption must overcome it by showing
clearly that he was prejudiced by a denial of his constitutional rights. Mayne v. Turner, 24 Ut.ah 2d 195, 198,
468 P. 2d 369, 371 (1970). A review of appellant's guilty
plea will reveal that appellant has not overcome this preswnption.
The Constitutional standard for accepting a valid
guilty plea as established in Kercheval v. United States,
27-l U. S. 220 (1927), wherein it was enunciated that "a
plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntar-
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ily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 223. The
elements of the last requirement (the only requirement
in issue in the present case) that the plea be intelligently
entered were defined in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S.
742 (1969). In that case, the petitioner, advised by competent counsel, tendered his guilty plea after his co-defendant decided to plead guilty and became available w
testify against him. The court held that the defendant's
plea was made intelligently because the record showed
that:
"He was advised by competent counsel, he
was made aware of the nature of the charge
against him, and there was nothing to indicate
that he was incompetent or otherwise not in con·
trol of his mental faculties." Id. at 756.
The overall record in the present case shows that
appellant's plea meets these three elements of an intelli·
gently entered plea of guilty.
First, appellant was advised by competent counsel.
Petitioner was asked at his arraignment whether he had
discussed the matter with his counsel to which he replied
that he had (Exhibit 2, P. 2). He further testified at the
habeas corpus hearing that he and his counsel discussed
his plea in connection with a possible plea bargain, and
that he decided to plead guilty (R. 45-47). Petitioner's
counsel was present during appellant's arraignment (Ex·
hibit 2, PP. 1, 2), and during the entering of his guilty
plea (Exhibit 1, P. 2). Under Utah law, if the accused
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is represented by competent counsel, there is a presump-tion that he has been fully advised concerning his rights.
Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 442, 473 P. 2d 901,
904 ( 1971). Johnson, supra, defines competent counsel
as a member of the bar in good standing who has represented the accused in a diligent and capable manner. Id.
at 442, 904. The competency of appellant's trial counsel
is not disputed. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Price was
fully advised of his constitutional rights when he pied
guilty.

Secondly, appellant was aware of the charge against
issuing a check against insufficient funds. Appellant testified that he had previously been convicted for
issuing insufficient fund checks in 1960 and 1963 (R. 44,
45), and served a total of five years and ten months for
those offenses (R. 48). Therefore, it seems somewhat
suspect that in 1969, on the present insufficient funds
check charge, appellant could reasonably argue that he
was unaware of the charge against him. There is no question that previous convictions of the same or similar
crimes may be used to show an accused's familiarity with
and knowledge of the crime he is currently charged with.
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968 (1968),
this court held that the past criminal experience of one
contending a violation of his constitutional rights could
be looked to by the trial court in disposing of the issue.
The record of Mr. Price's arraignment also verifies that
he requested and received additional time (one week)
following his arraignment to discuss his plea with counsel
him -
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(Exhibit 2, P. 2), implying that he had sufficient oppor.
tunity t-0 familiarize himself with the "nature of th,
charge against him."
Thirdly, appellant testified that he was a high sch()(Ji
graduate, and had completed one year of college (R. 48i.
indicating his sufficient mental capabilities. Furthennore.
there was no indication that Mr. Price was under the in·
fluence of alcohol or drugs, or suffered from any physiC11
or mental defects when he pleaded guilty. Thus, appe/.
Lant was competent and had control of his mental facu/.
ties.
It can be concluded that appellant's plea was inteJli.
gently entered according to the standard set forth in
Brady, supra.

Appellant contends, however, that in addition to the
Brady standard, the record must show that appellant wa;
informed of and specifically waived his constitutional
rights. To support this contention appellant relies heavily
on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969). In that case,
the defendant, Boykin, had pleaded guilty to five counts
of armed robbery, and was sentenced to death on each
count as provided by Alabama law. Unlike the circum
stances in the present case, the record in Boykin was com·
pletely silent as to any questions directed by the judge
to the defendant or any statements made by the defen·
dant or his attorney regarding the plea. The court con·
eluded that the acceptance of Boykin's guilty plea, under
the circumstances of the case, constituted reversible error
because the record did not disclose that the pctitione
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rnluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea.
Id. at 244. In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned
that tlu·ee constitutional rights are waived when a plea
of guilty is entered: The privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right
w confront one's accusers. The court refused to presume
a waiver of these rights from a silent record. Id. at 243.
Contrary to appellant's inferences, the court found
no new requirement that the aforementioned constitutional rights must be specifically explained and waived
before a guilty plea can be considered intelligently made.
Boykin, supra, only held that a waiver of these rights
cannot be presumed from a silent record. Id. at 243. The
court in the subsequent case of Brady, supra, found that:
"The new element added in Boykin was the
requirement that the record must affirmatively
disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily."
397 U. S. at 748, n. 4.
None of the United States Supreme Court cases after
Boykin have required a judge to get a specific waiver of
the rights suggested by appellant. See Brady v. United
States, supra, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759
(1970), Parlier v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970),
nnd North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit,
held in United States v. Webb, 433 F. 2d 400 (1st Cir.
Fl70), that the specific waiver of certain constitutional
; ight:-, was an unnecessary element of a valid guilt plea.
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In that case, after discussion with counsel, the defendant
pied guilty to violating the Dyer Act. He later contended
that the court failed to inform him that by pleading
guilty, he was waiving certain constitutional rights. The
court reasoned that it was self-evident that these rights
were being waived, and that it would not add to defendant's understanding to "require the court to recite a
ritualistic list of constitutional rights that are obviously
being waived." Id. at 403.
Ntunerous state courts also do not require that constitutional rights be specifically defined and waived. The
Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Turner, 186 Neb.
424, 425, 183 N. W. 2d 763, 765 (1971), held that the judge
in a trial court does not have to tell the defendant every
constitutional right, and obtain an expressed waiver of
each before the plea can be said to be intelligently made.
The court was of the opinion that an item-by-item review
of constitutional rights waived when a guilty plea is entered is too extreme a construction of Boykin, and that
the essential point is whether the accused understands
the relevant factors involved in a guilty plea. The Wash·
ington Supreme Court similarly held that the mere fact
that the trial court failed to advise the respondent, !Je.
fore accepting his plea of guilty, that he thereby forfeited
rights incident to trial and failed to further advise him
of the maximtun sentence which the court could impose
upon him, did not render the respondent's guilty plea
void on the ground that it was not intelligently made.
Meisbauer v. Rhay, 79 Wash. 2d 505, 487 P. 2d 1046

(1971). Finally, in People v. Jaworski, 25 Mich. App.
5-10, 181 N. W. 2d 811 ( 1970) , the Michigan Court of
refused to interpret Boykin as requiring the trial
court to specifically inform a defendant represented by
counsel of certain constitutional rights waived by entering
a guilty plea. The court reasoned that intelligence and
roluntariness have nothing to do with waiver of the constitutional rights as mentioned in Boykin, and that intelligence means only that the accused had sufficient
/;nnwledge of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Id. at 554, 817-818. Therefore, case authority
does not support appellant's contention that certain constitutional rights must be specifically explained and
waived before a plea of guilty can be intelligently entered.
The state submits that the record in appellant's case
is not silent. It affirmatively shows that Mr. Price intelligently entered his plea of guilty according to the
standards expressed in Brady, supra: Appellant was advised by competent counsel, was aware of the charges
against him and knew of the possible sentence he would
receive, and was in full control of his mental faculties
when he pled guilty.
To prevent the possibility of confessed criminals
using procedural loopholes to flood the courts with postconviction proceedings, appellate courts have long strived
to avoid imposing excessively formalistic procedural requirements upon judges in the lower courts. For example:
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,
:384 U. S. 436 (1966), qualified its ruling by providing
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that warnings of rights were not constitutionally required
if an adPquate substitute could be found. Id. at 467. This
same policy has been applied to guilty plea cases. The
Oregon Court of Appeals held on February 10, 1972, that
they will not impose a rigid formula on lower state courts
in their determinations of the validity of guilty plea;;;
rather a judge who accepts a guilty plea must have suff icient W.titude to tailor his questions to the needs of the
defendant before him. Raisley v. Sullivan, Or. App., 493
P. 2d 745, 747 (1972). Respondent contends that Judge
Nelson did just that. He was aware of the defendant's
previous criminal record, and that Mr. Price was familiar
with the nature of the charge and the consequences of
a guilty plea (Exhibit 1, P. 3). Judge Nelson further
knew that defendant was represented by competent counsel and had been given a week to discuss hi" plea with
his counsel (Exhibit 1, P. 2). (It has long been the
sumption underlying the adversary system that counsel
can be depended upon to look after the interests of defendants to the extent, at the very least, of providing
legal information and advice. However, appellant, by
petition, actually seeks to by-pass this function of coun·
sel, and place the burden on the trial judge.) Finally.
Judge Nelson gave the defendant the opportunity to be
heard. Yet Mr. Price had nothing to say to the court
(Exhibit 1, P. 3). The state, therefore, contends that all
questions concerning the guilty plea were tailored to the
needs of the defendant, and that there was no denial of
any of appellant's constitutional rights because his plea
of guilty was intelligently entered.
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POINT IL
TH i_: C 0 U RT BELOW PROPERLY AD:\IITTED APPELLANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL
RECORD INTO EVIDENCE.
During the petitioner's habeas corpus hearing, respondent offered into evidence a copy of .Mr. Price's prior
criminal record from the St.ate Bureau of Criminal Identification (Exhibit 3). Appellant objected to the introduction of the exhibit on the grounds that it was hearsay
and not relevant (R. 42). The evidence was admitted
by the court over appellant's objection (R. 42).
Respondent submits that Exhibit 3 is not hearsay,
and that the court properly overruled appellant's objection.
Hearsay is defined in the Vt.ah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 6:3 as:
"Evidence of a st.atement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter st.ated

"

!\Ir. Price's prior criminal record was not offered to prove
the truth of the matter st.ated, but rather to show that
appellant made a knowledgable guilty plea because he
familiar with the criminal process generally, and was
specifically familiar with the nature of the charge against
liim, and the consequences of pleading guilty to that
charge (R. 42).
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45). Thus, the evidence contained in the disputed ex.
hibit is properly in the court record anyway. To gain a
reversal on appeal, appellant must show error that is so
prejudicial that there is at least a fair likelihood that the
result would have been different had the error not been
committed. Startin v. Madsen, 120 UUl.h 631, 636, 237 P.
2d 834, 836 {1951). In view of appellant's testimony cited
above, he has clearly failed t;o show that the error he now
alleges would in all likelihood have caused a different
result had the alleged error not been committed since the
incriminating evidence was contained in the record without reference t;o Exhibit 3. Therefore, the admittance of
the evidence of Exhibit 3 was not prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial record clearly shows that
appellant knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of
guilty; that Judge Jeppson properly admitted appellant's
prior criminal record into evidence; and that if it was error
to admit such evidence, it was not prejudicial error.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

